The future of the British strategic nuclear force

The British government decided in 1980 to replace its aging Polaris force with the U.S. Trident submarine. In 1982 it decided to fit that submarine with the D‐5 missile. In the 1983 general election the Conservative government won handily, in part, on the issue of the continued legitimacy of nuclear deterrence. As a result, the government's decision to modernize the independent deterrent appeared to be supported by electoral mandate (although the question of specific support for Trident remained open). In fact, support within the government and among members of the British strategic community has become less than enthusiastic due primarily to the rising costs of the Trident program. Also, the opposition parties and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament have declared their opposition to Trident. The future of the British strategic deterrent is thus being shaped in a very ambivalent environment. On the one hand, the basic programmatic decisions have been made and apparently ratified by the electoral process. On the other hand, significant doubts remain about the Trident decision. This article examines these doubts and projects the likely range of choices in the years ahead as well as the implications of various alternatives for Britain's allies and the Soviet Union

Conservative government · Disarmament · Economics · Government (linguistics · Legitimacy · Mandate · Nuclear strategy · Nuclear weapon · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Trident · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies · History · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense · Public Administration