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Minimum Deterrence and Russian and Chinese Threat Developments

Bibliographic Data

ID11221677
AuthorsMark Schneider (0000-0002-8385-345X), Mark B Schneider (0000-0001-7713-0450, National Institute for Public Policy, corresponding author)
Year2014
Volume33
Issue3
Pages193-204
Publication date2014-05-27
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueComparative Strategy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0149-5933 • E-ISSN: 1521-0448
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/01495933.2014.926715
OpenAlexW2032627436
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited3

Minimum Deterrence advocates, such as the Global ZERO report chaired by retired General James Cartwright, often urge the elimination of the U.S. triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers and minimum modernization of U.S. nuclear forces. These recommendations ignore fundamental realities. Both Russia and China have announced that they intend to increase their nuclear forces and both are modernizing their forces. Russia and China regard the U.S. as their main enemy and are arming against us. The Minimum Deterrence assumption that there is no risk of a conflict between the U.S. and Russia or China is a dangerous one. Both Russia and China have significant territorial claims against their neighbors. Russian claims to the Arctic Ocean and Chinese claims over the South China Sea are particularly troubling. China continues to threaten war over Taiwan. China has increasingly used military might to support its territorial claims in the South China Sea, creating incidents that have the potential to escalate into war. The most fundamental problem with Minimum Deterrence is that it intentionally degrades our deterrence of nuclear or other WMD attack, as well as our ability to deter nuclear escalation in a situation where the U.S. provides allies a credible nuclear umbrella. U.S. failure to provide a credible nuclear umbrella could result in Japan and, possibly other nations, deciding to go nuclear in order to protect themselves

Adversary · China · Computer security · Deterrence theory · Economics · International trade · Modernization theory · Nuclear warfare · Nuclear weapon · Political economy · Political science · Sociology · Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense

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Unique citing works1
Citations per year0.13
Citation span2018 - 2018 (1)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 1

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