Thinking about Nuclear Deterrence Theory
Why Evolutionary Psychology Undermines Its Rational Actor Assumptions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11221859 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bradley A Thayer (Missouri State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 311-323 |
| Publication date | 2007-10-25 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Comparative Strategy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0149-5933 • E-ISSN: 1521-0448 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/01495930701598573 |
| OpenAlex | W2072193806 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
For too long, nuclear deterrence theorists have remained apart from the revolution in the life sciences, and particularly evolutionary psychology, which has fundamentally changed the scientific understanding of the human mind. As a result of advances in evolutionary psychology, we now know that how the brain interprets actions and makes decisions is complicated, imperfect, greatly dependent upon emotions, and varied among humans. Consequently, it is fundamentally naïve and dangerous to assume a similar outcome in deterrent situations when there is variation in cognition among leaders. The rational deterrence model's assumption of a universal rationality is irredeemably flawed and students of nuclear deterrence must replace it with a gradated understanding of rationality
Bounded rationality · Cognition · Criminology · Deterrence (psychology · Deterrence theory · Economics · Epistemology · Evolutionary psychology · Imperfect · Microeconomics · Political science · Positive economics · Rationality · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.35 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2024 (16) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |