Dictators and Deterrence
Syria's Assad, Chemical Weapons, and the Threat of U.S. Military Action
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11221867 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eric R Sterner (Missouri State University, corresponding author), Eric Sterner (0000-0002-4591-6632) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 407-423 |
| Publication date | 2014-10-20 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Comparative Strategy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0149-5933 • E-ISSN: 1521-0448 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/01495933.2014.962958 |
| OpenAlex | W2054758818 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
The United States’ attempt to deter chemical weapons use by the Syrian government failed largely due to the former's lack of credibility. Having seen its implicit deterrent threats ignored in spring and summer, 2013, the United States scrambled to restore them by threatening to use force explicitly, only to find that its credibility was exhausted. Syria's subsequent pledge to give up its chemical weapons, popularly explained as a response to renewed U.S. threats, likely reflected a strategic environment changed more by developments in Syria than any application of U.S. deterrent strategy
Action (physics · Chemical warfare · Credibility · Deterrence theory · Economics · Government (linguistics · Pledge · Political economy · Political science · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · Law · Middle East Politics and Society · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
| Citations per year | 0.11 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2017 - 2017 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |