The Role of Government Structure in Deterrence

This article analyzes the effect of governmental structures on the deterrent calculus of nation-states. It identifies certain governing structures, and their functional relationships, that are likely to influence a particular regime's propensity to take risks and engage in war. The article then explores the institutional dimension of three familiar case studies in which American or Western efforts at deterrence (or compellence) failed: Nazi Germany in the late 1930s; Imperial Japan during the early 1940s; and Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1990 and 2003. These case studies highlight the point that there are significant differences in governmental structure among regimes that are generally classified as “nondemocratic” or “ideological/theocratic.” For instance, Iranian and North Korean governmental institutions, as well as their political cultures, differ in important respects. American efforts to pressure—or, alternatively, accommodate—such hostile regimes can have exactly the opposite effect of that intended, if U.S. policy does not adequately account for the distinctive character of those institutions. Deterrent policies that aim to influence the decisions of particular individuals or agencies within the governmental structure are especially difficult to execute

Deterrence (psychology · Deterrence theory · Government (linguistics · Ideology · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Political structure · Politics · Sociology · Theocracy · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Public Administration · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence