Triangular or indirect deterrence/compellence

Something new in deterrence theory

Bibliographic Data

ID11222497
AuthorsRobert E Harkavy (Pennsylvania State University, corresponding author)
Year1998
Volume17
Issue1
Pages63-81
Publication date1998-01-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueComparative Strategy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0149-5933 • E-ISSN: 1521-0448
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/01495939808403132
OpenAlexW2041777640
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited24

Some recent events, and some hypothesized scenarios for the future, indicate the possible emerging importance of a wholly new strategic concept, that of “triangular” or “indirect” deterrence. It is related to extended deterrence in the sense that it may be brought into play by the failure of extended deterrence. Therein, a regional nuclear power unable to counter‐deter (conventional or nuclear) threats by a major power because of technological incapacity and distance factors, may attempt to achieve deterrence vis‐a‐vis that power with the threat to ‘ strike neighboring or nearby states, whether or not they are directly engaged in the ongoing conflict. Three case studies are here examined: the Israel‐Arab‐U.S.S.R. triangle, circa 1970–1990; the Iraqi Scud attacks against Israel and Saudi Arabia in 1991; and hypothesized Iranian or Iraqi responses to a U.S. strategic campaign in repeat of Desert Storm

Criminology · Desert (philosophy · Deterrence (psychology · Deterrence theory · Great power · Law and economics · Nuclear weapon · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Sociology · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies · Intelligence, Security, War Strategy · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub