Dealerting proposals for strategic nuclear forces

Proposals for dealerting U.S. strategic nuclear forces would impose structural or procedural constraints that hypothetically would impede nuclear weapons from being delivered. The dealerters’ rationale is that, by removing strategic systems from an alleged “hair‐trigger” posture, these measures would reduce the risks of catastrophic accidents and would give U.S. and Russian political authorities more time to make critical decisions during crises. Largely the product of U.S. arms‐control advocates, dealerting proposals seek a radical “quick fix” to the evolutionary START process and represent a dangerous “back door” to nuclear disarmament. As this article demonstrates, dealerting schemes are risky formulas for undermining a prudent U.S. deterrent posture that emphasizes, above all, the safety and security of its nuclear forces. The article focuses on the deleterious potential impact of these proposals on the Trident nuclear‐powered ballistic‐missile submarine force that is shouldering an increasing burden of U.S. nuclear‐deterrence requirements

Arms control · Ballistic missile · Business · Deterrence theory · Disarmament · Economics · International trade · Law and economics · Missile · Nuclear ethics · Nuclear force · Nuclear weapon · Physics · Political science · Engineering · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense

• Post‐cold war requirements for U.S. nuclear deterrence policy

  Keith B Payne•Comparative Strategy•1998

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• Crimson tide

  Mel lyman•Comparative Strategy•1999

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• Preventive Defense

  Eliot A Cohen, Ashton B Carter et al.•Foreign Affairs•1999

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