What the Next Arab-Israeli War Might Look Like
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11261981 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Steven J Rosen (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1978 |
| Volume | 2 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 149 |
| Publication date | 1978-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Security (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0162-2889 • E-ISSN: 1531-4804 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2538462 |
| OpenAlex | W2066466533 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 2 |
The euphoria surrounding the Autumn 1977 peace initiatives is beginning to subside, and there is renewed speculation in Washington and in the media about the possibility of a fifth Arab-Israeli war. Speculation on this subject is significant not only for the forward planning of policy, but also for current decisions on arms transfers, force deployments, and the larger context of foreign policy. Crisis forecasting can either construct a matrix of all possible combinations of future circumstances to develop alternative scenarios, or develop a single likely case at length. What follows is an exercise of the second type: a straightforward prediction of a specific future based on a reading of current trends. The most likely context of a fifth war, though not the only conceivable one, would be a situation in which the current search for a diplomatic settlement reaches an impasse and one or more Arab feels it necessary to resort to the war option to break a no-war, no-peace stalemate. Those who have been critical of President Sadat's initiative will feel obligated to demonstrate an alternative means to put pressure on the Israelis and the United States. The confrontation states have explicitly reserved the war option for such a circumstance, and even Egypt may feel impelled to demonstrate its commitment and willingness to use military means if its bold diplomatic efforts fail. Once a political stalemate is unambiguously visible to all parties and no realistic hope remains of a negotiated settlement, the war option is bound to resume primary significance for at least some of the front-line states.' However, it is unlikely that the decision to go to war will follow immediately upon the development of the impasse in the negotiations. One restraining factor will be the reorientation of the Egyptian and to a lesser extent the Syrian and Iraqi armed forces from Soviet equipments to Western hardware and aircraft. Deliveries on many of the major contracts with French and British suppliers are not scheduled until 1980 and later, and it is reasonable to assume that it will take some time to absorb the new equipment, retrain the armies, and reorganize tactical and strategic doctrines accordingly. The Arabs may have to choose between an early war based on Soviet supplies, which are already ample in Syria, Iraq, and Libya and could in theory be reintroduced in Egypt on a relatively short lead
Political economy · Political science · Sociology · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Jewish and Middle Eastern Studies
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,06 |
| Citation span | 1978 - 2020 (43) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |