Boom, Bling, Backbone, or Blip? The Signaling Inherent in Arms Transfers
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11262373 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jennifer Spindel (0000-0002-5908-4611, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 164-204 |
| Publication date | 2025-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Security (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0162-2889 • E-ISSN: 1531-4804 |
| Publisher | MIT Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1162/isec_a_00505 |
| OpenAlex | W4407898090 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
Why do states send and seek conventional weapons? Though it may seem obvious that the balance of power motivates states to do so, numerous conventional arms transfers do not conform to the balance of power logic. This article argues that states seek weapons because arms transfers send signals about political alignments. Misunderstanding this signaling dynamic is part of the reason why the arms trade literature reaches divergent findings about the causes and consequences of arms sales. To explain how signaling dynamics operate alongside balance of power considerations, this article proposes a theory of arms transfers as symbolic signals. The article presents a typology of conventional weapons based on the weapons’ military utility and prestige and shows that different types of conventional weapons transfers send different signals about the political closeness or distance between the sender and receiver. I examine the case of arms sales to the Middle East before the 1967 Six-Day War to show the signaling function of arms transfers
Boom · Economics · Keynesian economics · Political economy · Political science · Computer Science · Military History and Strategy · Technology Assessment and Management · Geology
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |