Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars

Bibliographic Data

ID11262650
AuthorsEliot A Cohen (corresponding author)
Year1984
Volume9
Issue2
Pages151
Publication date1984-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Security (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0162-2889 • E-ISSN: 1531-4804
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2538671
OpenAlexW2033605694
LanguageEN
Citations received30
References cited16

It is the characteristic military dilemma of a world power that it finds itself forced to prepare for two entirely different kinds of wars, large-scale conflicts on the continent of Europe, on the one hand, and lesser battles on its periphery or on other continents, on the other. This difficulty perplexed British statesmen throughout the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; it is now the problem of the United States, Britain's heir as the foremost global power. This article examines the constraints on America's ability to prepare for, wage, and win wars. It is often argued that American statesmen will find themselves constrained from using force in the future by public and Congressional repugnance over a repetition of the Vietnam experience. There is some truth in this. What follows, however, will suggest that institutional constraints and to a lesser extent foreign pressures, rather than the vagaries of public opinion, will inhibit American leaders from commencing such wars, and from prosecuting them successfully. We begin by addressing three questions: What precisely do we mean by the term small war? Why is there reason to think that such wars are inevitable? How do the requirements of preparing for such wars differ from the normal military measures of a Great Power

Political economy · Political science · Sociology · Military and Defense Studies

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