Application of Ex ante measures in political delegation

The case of Lithuania

Bibliographic Data

ID11264340
AuthorsGiedrius Žvaliauskas (0000-0001-8970-0756, Kaunas University of Technology, corresponding author)
Year2004
Volume35
Issue3
Pages254-277
Publication date2004-09-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Baltic Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0162-9778 • E-ISSN: 1751-7877
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/01629770400000101
OpenAlexW2119999562
LanguageEN
References cited14

This article employs the principal-agent model to broaden the understanding of the interrelationship between Lithuanian political parties and the members of parliament (MPs). An analysis of ex ante measures in containing agency losses revealed that Lithuanian political parties (the proximate principals) encounter undisciplined behaviour on the part of their MPs (the agents). Furthermore, the majority of political parties have experienced difficulties in selecting the ‘right’ candidates and the ‘right’ MPs. This outcome challenges the principles of delegation and accountability and, most likely, diminishes the representative functions of the Lithuanian political parties at the initial stage of the political delegation chain

Accountability · Agency (philosophy · Delegation · Economics · Ex-ante · Lithuanian · Macroeconomics · Parliament · Political science · Politics · Principal (computer security · Social science · Sociology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · European Union Policy and Governance · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration

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