The Source and Locus of Intrinsic Value
A Reexamination
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11265053 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Keekok Lee (0000-0001-8400-9990, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1996 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 297-309 |
| Publication date | 1996-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Environmental Ethics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0163-4275 • E-ISSN: 2153-7895 |
| Publisher | Philosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.5840/enviroethics199618320 |
| OpenAlex | W1762717338 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
In the literature of environmental philosophy, the single most potent argument that has been made against the claim that nature may possess intrinsic value in any objective sense is the Humean thesis of projectivism and its associated view that human consciousness is the source of all values. Theorists, in one way or another, have to face up to this challenge. For instance, J. Baird Callicott upholds this Humean foundation to modern Western philosophy. However, by distinguishing between the source and locus of value, he makes it possible to argue that nature is the locus of intrinsic value without at the same time compromising the thesis that human consciousness is the source of all values. On the other hand, Holmses Rolston, III, another eminent environmental philosopher, criticizes the distinction as well as challenges the Humean foundation itself. In this article, I attempt to resolve the disagreement between Callicott and Rolston over this particular distinction, thereby doing justice to the insights which each theorist, undoubtedly, has brought to bear on the issue of intrinsic value, at least as far as individual organisms is concerned. However, I am also critical of both for having failed to draw out the full implications behind certain crucial distinctions that should be made about the notion of intrinsic value itself
Applied philosophy · Biology · Contemporary philosophy · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · General interest · Environmental Philosophy and Ethics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Religion, Ecology, and Ethics · Genetics
Animal Welfare and Environmental Ethics
Rolston, Lonergan, and the Intrinsic Value of Nature
The Moral Status of Non-human Beings and Their Ecosystems
The moral status of non‐human beings and their ecosystems
Reconciling utilitarian and non-utilitarian approaches to biodiversity conservation
Relational value, partnership, eudaimonia
Anthropocentrism as the scapegoat of the environmental crisis
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,26 |
| Citation span | 1999 - 2022 (24) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |