Artifacts and the Limitations of Moral Considerability
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11266151 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Magdalena Hoły-Łuczaj (0000-0001-5860-3638, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 41 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 69-87 |
| Publication date | 2019-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Environmental Ethics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0163-4275 • E-ISSN: 2153-7895 |
| Publisher | Philosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.5840/enviroethics20194116 |
| OpenAlex | W2984291160 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
Environmental philosophy always presents detailed distinctions concerning the kinds of natural beings that can be granted moral considerability, when discussing this issue. In contrast, artifacts, which are excluded from the scope of moral considerability, are treated as one homogenous category. This seems problematic. An attempt to introduce certain distinctions in this regard—by looking into dissimilarities between physical and digital artifacts—can change our thinking about artifacts in ethical terms, or more precisely, in environmentally ethical terms
Applied philosophy · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Sociology · Computer Science · Environmental Philosophy and Ethics · Geographies of human-animal interactions · History · Philosophy · Psychology · Religion, Ecology, and Ethics
| Citations per year | 0.6 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2026 (6) |
| Highly cited | No |