The Iranian Nuclear Riddle after June 12

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. National Intelligence Estimate [NIE], Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, November 2007), http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf 2. Ervand Abrahamian, “I am not a speck of dirt, I am a retired teacher,” London Review of Books, July 23, 2009, p. 34. 3. Polls frequently attest to the public desire from all groups within Iran for normal relations with the United States. See Alvin Richman, David Nolle, and Elaine El Assai, “Iranian Public Is Not Monolithic: Iranians Divide Over Their Government But Unite on Forgoing Nuclear Weapons,” WorldPublicOpinion.org, May 18, 2009, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/incl/printable_version.php?pnt=609 (hereinafter WorldPublicOpinion Poll); Ken Ballen and Patrick Doherty “The Iranian People Speak,” The Muslim Observer, June 15, 2009, http://muslimmedianetwork.com/mmn/?p=4206. 4. See Kayhan Barzegar “The Paradox of Iran's Nuclear Consensus,” World Policy Journal 26, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 21–30. Well intentioned foreigners have bought into the argument that the nuclear program reflects a quest for respect after years of humiliation, depicting it as a “quasi holy symbol.” This is wide off the mark. See Roger Cohen, “The U.S.-Iranian Triangle,” New York Times, September 27, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/28/opinion/28iht-edcohen.html 5. WorldPublicOpinion Poll; Ballen and Doherty “The Iranian People Speak.” 6. An example is Hossein Mousavian, a former nuclear negotiator, who attempted to outline the dangers of having the issue referred to UN Security Council, and was subsequently harassed. For the press restrictions directive, see “Iranian Regime Instructs Press on How to Report on Nuclear Issue and Iraq,” MEMRI Special Dispatch, no. 1899 (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Media Research Institute, April 16, 2008), http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Area=sd&ID=SP189908&Page=archives. Also note how debate on policy has been inhibited. A prominent reformist commentator noted that it has become an untouchable issue: “It is forbidden to talk about nuclear policy—you cannot oppose it in any way.” See Anna Fifield “Iran's Nuclear Ambition Rises Above Domestic Debate,” Financial Times, February 19, 2008, http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto021920081219509066 7. NIE, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. 8. See Shahram Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2006). 9. See Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions; Shahram Chubin, “Iran: Domestic Politics and Nuclear Choices” in Strategic Asia 2007-08, eds. Ashley Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle: National Bureau of Research, 2007), pp. 299–338; Shahram Chubin, “Understanding Iran's Nuclear Ambitions” in Double Trouble, ed. Patrick Cronin (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008), pp. 47–62. 10. “Resistance Led to Great Nuclear Victory,” Tehran Times, February 27, 2008; Daniel Dombey and Harvey Morris, “U.S. Sees Tehran Nuclear Dispute Going into 2009,” Financial Times, February 27, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4bfc2bf6-e4d7-11dc-a495-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1 11. See “Iran Rejected Internal Call for Nuclear Freeze, Diplomats Claim,” Global Security Newswire, August 27, 2009, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090827_7250.php 12. For a recent discussion of this issue, see Farideh Farhi, “Ahmadinejad's Nuclear Folly,” Middle East Report, no. 252 (Fall 2009), http://www.merip.org/mer/mer252/farhi.html 13. This is a suspicion that is likely to have increased since June 2009. See Meir Javedanfar, “Iran's Crisis Has Nuclear Fallout,” Guardian, July 19, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jul/19/iran-nuclear-programme 14. See Christopher de Bellaigue, “Obama's Iranian Charm Offensive,” Prospect, June 2009, p. 57. 15. See Farhi, “Ahmadinejad's Nuclear Folly.” 16. See Chester A. Crocker, “Terms of Engagement,” New York Times, September 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/opinion/14crocker.html 17. For a similar proposal, see Michael Singh, “Broadening the U.S. Approach to Iran,” PolicyWatch, no. 1578 (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 15, 2009), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3116 18. See, for example, the cartoonist Chappate, who depicted Ahmadinejad addressing two glum, bloodstained clerics by stating: “After the free and fair elections, let's get back to our peaceful nuclear projects.” See International Herald Tribune, July 8, 2009, p. 7. President Nicolas Sarkozy noted: “It's the same Iranian leaders who tell us that the nuclear program is peaceful who tell us that their elections were honest. Who can believe them?” See “Iran Rejected Internal Call for Nuclear Freeze, Diplomats Claim,” Global Security Newswire, August 27, 2009, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090827_7250.php Additional informationNotes on contributorsShahram ChubinShahram Chubin is a nonresident senior associate of the nonproliferation program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is based in Geneva. He also served as the director of studies at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy in Switzerland from 1996 to 2009

Argument (complex analysis · Humiliation · Media studies · National security · Political science · Sociology · Law · Medicine · Nuclear Issues and Defense

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