From Johann to Maurice

Science and Expression in the Philosophical Praxis of Medicine

Bibliographic Data

ID11274574
AuthorsTimm Heinbokel (0000-0002-3595-0562, Charité - Universitätsmedizin Berlin, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume44
Issue4
Pages559-579
Publication date2021-12-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueHuman Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0163-8548 • E-ISSN: 1572-851X
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10746-021-09605-3
OpenAlexW3205736111
LanguageEN
References cited25

Phenomenology’s return to lived experience and “to the things themselves” is often contrasted with the synthesized perspective of science and its “view from nowhere.” The extensive use of neuropsychological case reports in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception , however, suggests that the relationship between phenomenology and science is more complex than a sheer opposition, and a fruitful one for the praxis of medicine. Here, I propose a new reading of how Merleau-Ponty justifies his use of Adhémar Gelb and Kurt Goldstein’s reports on Johann Schneider for his phenomenology of embodied perception. I argue that for Merleau-Ponty these neuropsychological case reports represent a coherent deformation of the intercorporeally expressed existence of Schneider that through speech fall again onto the common ground of perception, thereby allowing Merleau-Ponty to understand, in the equivalent sense delivered by language, Schneider’s total being and fundamental illness. I then discuss what Merleau-Ponty’s method implies for a phenomenological praxis of medicine, and for the role of science in this praxis

Embodied cognition · Epistemology · Modern philosophy · Opposition (politics · Perception · Phenomenology (philosophy · Politics · Praxis · Psychoanalysis · Empathy and Medical Education · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Psychology

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