Helmuth Plessner’s Schellingian Reconciliation of Idealism and Realism About the Psyche

Bibliographic Data

ID11274702
AuthorsMárton Dornbach (0000-0003-2391-9274, Eötvös Loránd University, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume47
Issue3
Pages501-534
Publication date2024-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueHuman Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0163-8548 • E-ISSN: 1572-851X
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10746-024-09708-7
OpenAlexW4392190862
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited22

While Schelling’s anticipation of Freudian psychoanalysis is well established, it has thus far gone unnoticed that Schelling’s ideas also proved fruitful in the context of a distinctively philosophical theory of the psyche developed by a younger contemporary of Freud. During the 1920s Helmuth Plessner, a key figure of philosophical anthropology, outlined a complex conception of the psyche as an individualized, inner region of reality. Although Plessner did not present his philosophical psychology in a systematic form, its building blocks can be found in The Unity of the Senses , The Limits of Community , and Levels of Organic Life and the Human , among other writings. Moreover, Plessner left a clue as to how these building blocks fit together, which suggests that Plessner viewed his philosophical psychology as structurally analogous to the model of personality outlined in Schelling’s 1809 treatise on human freedom. I propose that Plessner sought to formulate an alternative to both idealism and realism about the psyche that might reconcile the insights motivating these rival positions. Schelling provided Plessner with a workable model for such a reconciliation. After reviewing textual evidence for my hypothesis, I sketch Schelling’s predecessor theory. Based on the Schellingian template, I then reconstruct Plessner’s non-reductively naturalistic theory of the psyche, which aligns the real bodily ground of the psyche with its ideal existence. Highlighting the strengths of Plessner’s philosophical psychology against the foil of Paul Ricoeur’s and John McDowell’s relevant arguments, I argue that the theory reconstructed here deserves contemporary consideration as a plausible contender

Dialectic · Epistemology · Philosophical anthropology · Psyche · Psychoanalysis · German Social Sciences and History · Medical History and Research · Philosophy · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology

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