Feeling in Values

Axiological and Emotional Intentionality as Living Structure of Ethical Life, Regarding Max Scheler’s Phenomenology

Bibliographic Data

ID11275342
AuthorsJuan Velázquez (0000-0001-5553-5844, Universidad de Zaragoza, corresponding author)
Year2022
Publication date2022-12-20
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueHuman Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0163-8548 • E-ISSN: 1572-851X
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10746-022-09656-0
OpenAlexW4313438489
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited18

Some of the contemporary ethical debates have put in value the rational feature of feelings because of the estimative intentionality that is implied in them. In this context, some claim that the intentionality of emotions is a kind of value perception, as Phenomenology stressed at the beginning of the twentieth century, particularly Max Scheler, by analysing emotional Feeling [ Fühlen ] in the frame of emotional life. In order to extend the context of this philosophical debate, and after describing Scheler’s phenomenology of feelings of the intentional and non-intentional emotional life, firstly, we defend the axiological and emotional intentionality as double intentionality that—in our understanding—Scheler analyses phenomenologically, while taking distance from Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl’s intentional structure of estimative emotions. And, secondly, we propose a tentative interpretation of the link between estimative and emotional double intentionality as living structure of ethical life , in the light of Martin Heidegger’s Hermeneutical Phenomenology

Context (archaeology · Epistemology · Feeling · Intentionality · Interpretation (philosophy · Perception · Phenomenology (philosophy · Value (mathematics · Art, Aesthetics, and Perception · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophy · Psychoanalysis and Social Critique · Psychology · Social Psychology

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Open DOIOpen Access