Stable agreements through liability rules
A multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11285249 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kevin Techer (0000-0001-7625-8428, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St Etienne, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 111 |
| Pages | 77-88 |
| Publication date | 2021-05-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Mathematical Social Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0165-4896 • E-ISSN: 1879-3118 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.04.003 |
| OpenAlex | W3155927174 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 17 |
Compatibility (geochemistry · Core (optical fiber · Economics · Law and economics · Liability · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Political science · Social choice theory · Veto · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2022 - 2023 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |