Weighted fair division with matroid-rank valuations
Monotonicity and strategyproofness
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11285368 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Warut Suksompong (0000-0001-8973-2539, National University of Singapore, corresponding author), Nicholas Teh (0000-0002-9698-466X, University of Oxford) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 126 |
| Pages | 48-59 |
| Publication date | 2023-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Mathematical Social Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0165-4896 • E-ISSN: 1879-3118 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.09.004 |
| OpenAlex | W4387107393 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 25 |
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights corresponding to their entitlements. Previous work has shown that, when agents have binary additive valuations, the maximum weighted Nash welfare rule is resource-, population-, and weight-monotone, satisfies group-strategyproofness, and can be implemented in polynomial time. We generalize these results to the class of weighted additive welfarist rules with concave functions and agents with matroid-rank (also known as binary submodular) valuations
Class (philosophy · Combinatorics · Discrete mathematics · Fair division · Mathematical economics · Mathematical optimization · Matroid · Monotone polygon · Monotonic function · Population · Rank (graph theory · Submodular set function · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |