Weighted school choice problems and the weighted top trading cycles mechanism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11285406 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nadja Stroh-Maraun, Nadja Stroh‐Maraun (Paderborn University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 132 |
| Pages | 49-56 |
| Publication date | 2024-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Mathematical Social Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0165-4896 • E-ISSN: 1879-3118 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001 |
| OpenAlex | W4402312595 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 24 |
There are a number of school choice problems in which students are heterogeneous according to the number of seats they occupy at the school they are assigned to. We propose a weighted school choice problem by assigning each student a so-called weight and formulate the weighted top trading cycles algorithm (WTTC) to find a matching. The WTTC is strategy-proof and results in a Pareto efficient matching. While the WTTC is a robust extension of the TTC when weights are introduced, it is no longer guaranteed that each student gets a seat at a school even if the overall capacity exceeds the sum of weights. Additionally, the WTTC introduces a trade-off between weights and priorities as a student with a higher weight has a disadvantage to be matched to a particular school compared to a student with the same schools’ priorities but a smaller weight. • We propose a weighted school choice problem. • The proposed mechanism WTTC is strategy-proof and results in a Pareto efficient matching. • The WTTC introduces a trade-off between weights and priorities
Actuarial science · Business · Econometrics · Economics · Mathematical economics · Mechanism (biology · Microeconomics · School choice · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics · Politics, Economics, and Education Policy
| Highly cited | No |
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