Truncated Leximin solutions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11285609 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bram Driesen (Adam Smith Institute, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 83 |
| Pages | 79-87 |
| Publication date | 2016-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Mathematical Social Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0165-4896 • E-ISSN: 1879-3118 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.07.003 |
| OpenAlex | W2505242938 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 19 |
This paper shows that three classic properties for bargaining solutions in an environment with a variable number of agents–Anonymity (AN), Individual Monotonicity (IM), and Consistency (CONS)–characterize a one-parameter family of Truncated Leximin solutions . Given a non-negative and possibly infinite α, an α-Truncated Leximin solution gives each agent the minimum of α and their Leximin solution payoff
Anonymity · Consistency (knowledge bases · Discrete mathematics · Mathematical economics · Monotonic function · Stochastic game · Variable (mathematics · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Mathematics
Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle
Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations
The Bargaining Problem
Games and Decisions
A Bargaining Model for the Cooperative n-Person Game
Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining with a Variable Number of Agents
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |