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The informational structure of uniqueness theorems in axiomatic social theories

Bibliographic Data

ID11286191
AuthorsMarek M Kaminski (0000-0003-3997-0541, University of California, Irvine, corresponding author)
Year2004
Volume48
Issue2
Pages121-138
Publication date2004-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueMathematical Social Sciences (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0165-4896 • E-ISSN: 1879-3118
PublisherElsevier BV (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.11.004
OpenAlexW2163038160
LanguageEN
References cited20

Algebraic number · Algebraic theory · Axiom · Axiomatic system · Binary relation · Discrete mathematics · Mathematical economics · Set (abstract data type · Social choice theory · Uniqueness · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics

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