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Which acceptable agreements are equilibria

Bibliographic Data

ID11286240
AuthorsSylvie Thoron (Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques, corresponding author)
Year2004
Volume47
Issue1
Pages111-134
Publication date2004-01-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueMathematical Social Sciences (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0165-4896 • E-ISSN: 1879-3118
PublisherElsevier BV (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1016/s0165-4896(03)00084-2
OpenAlexW1973109730
LanguageEN
References cited19

Cartel · Collusion · Combinatorics · Conjecture · Economics · Externality · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Stability (learning theory · Stochastic game · Strategy · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics

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Highly citedNo

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