Connectedness of the set of manipulable equilibria
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11286504 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Zvi Safra (0000-0001-9899-1487, Tel Aviv University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1990 |
| Volume | 19 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 45-53 |
| Publication date | 1990-02-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Mathematical Social Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0165-4896 • E-ISSN: 1879-3118 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/0165-4896(90)90037-8 |
| OpenAlex | W2048739548 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 11 |
An equilibrium is manipulable if there exists a coalition that, by reallocating its members' endowments, can force a movement from that equilibrium to another one that is strictly preferred by every member of it. It is shown in this work that, in the framework of pure exchange economies, the set of manipulable equilibria is arc-connected (a property that is not shared by its complement)
Arc (geometry · Complement (music · Economics · Exchange economy · Geometry · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Physics · Property (philosophy · Set (abstract data type · Social connectedness · Work (physics · Chemistry · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Economic Theory and Policy · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics · Social Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
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