Do negative emotions explain punishment in power-to-take game experiments
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 11289111 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Fabio Galeotti (0000-0003-0221-5470, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2015 |
| Volumen | 49 |
| Páginas | 1-14 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2015-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Economic Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0167-4870 • E-ISSN: 1872-7719 |
| Editorial | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.joep.2015.03.005 |
| OpenAlex | W2464590864 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 4 |
| Referencias citadas | 28 |
Anger · Contempt · Context (archaeology · Power (physics · Punishment (psychology · Corruption and Economic Development · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Psychology · Social Psychology
A theory of sequential reciprocity
Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior
Unfairness, Anger, and Spite
The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment
Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments
“My Questionnaire is Too Long!” The assessments of motivational-affective constructs with three-item and single-item measures
What might emotions be? Comments on the Comments
Fairness perceptions and prosocial emotions in the power to take
The impact of real effort and emotions in the power-to-take game
From dual processes to multiple selves
Reciprocity and emotions in bargaining using physiological and self-report measures
Dual-process theories of decision-making
Affect and fairness
Emotional Hazard in a Power‐to‐Take Experiment
The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment
Studies on anger and aggression
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Risk as feelings
| Obras citantes distintas | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,57 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2019 - 2026 (8) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 4 |