Normativity and emotional vulnerability
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11340201 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Carla Bagnoli (0000-0003-2795-3795, University of Modena, Italy; University of Oslo, Norway, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 141-151 |
| Publication date | 2020-02-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy & Social Criticism (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0191-4537 • E-ISSN: 1461-734X |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0191453718810914 |
| OpenAlex | W3000853382 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
Are the emotions relevant for the theory of value and normativity? Is there a set of morally correct arrangements of emotions? Current debates are often structured as though there were only two theoretical options to approach these questions, a sentimentalist theory of some sort, which emphasizes the role of emotions in forming ethical behaviour and practical thought, and intellectualist rationalism, which denies that emotions can help at all in generating normativity and contributing to moral value, hence also denying that they may have any role to play in moral agency and moral thinking. In what follows, I will offer a Kantian account of ‘practical reason’ as the seat of moral agency, which recognizes a diversified and complex relation between reason and sensibility
Agency (philosophy · Epistemology · Moral agency · Moral psychology · Morality · Political science · Rationalism · Relation (database · Sensibility · Set (abstract data type · Sociology · Value (mathematics · Vulnerability (computing · Computer Science · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2023 (4) |
| Highly cited | No |