Justifying the right to justification
An analysis of Rainer Forst’s constructivist theory of justice
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11340261 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Fernando Suárez Muller (University of Humanistic Studies, The Netherlands, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 39 |
| Issue | 10 |
| Pages | 1049-1068 |
| Publication date | 2013-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy & Social Criticism (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0191-4537 • E-ISSN: 1461-734X |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0191453713507012 |
| OpenAlex | W2050931951 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
The work of Rainer Forst constitutes the third generation of the Habermasian School. In Das Recht auf Rechtfertigung [The right to justification] (2007) Forst develops a constructivist approach to justice in a serious effort to find a systematic basis for ‘critical theory’. In this article the relevant arguments of this approach are critically analysed. The position developed in the work of Forst appears to be characterized by a fundamental ambiguity because it oscillates between two irreconcilable points. On the one hand Forst seems to admit the necessity of something like the ‘unconditionality of moral law’ presupposing a kind of Kantian transcendentalism beyond constructivism. But on the other hand, he turns back to a more Habermasian constructivist or proceduralist theory. The ambiguity implicit in Forst’s philosophy is that it does not find a compromise between these two approaches to discursive theory so it fluctuates between them, needing the logical support of both poles
Ambiguity · Compromise · Constructivism (international relations · Economic Justice · Epistemology · Political science · Social science · Sociology · Critical Theory and Philosophy · Law · Law and Political Science · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,17 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2020 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |