Conscientious objection and the limits of dialogue
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11340508 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christopher Cowley (0000-0002-1193-826X, University College Dublin, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 10 |
| Pages | 1004-1014 |
| Publication date | 2016-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy & Social Criticism (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0191-4537 • E-ISSN: 1461-734X |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0191453716631168 |
| OpenAlex | W2356187430 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 5 |
In Kimberly Brownlee’s book, Conscience and Conviction, she argues that Thomas More’s paradigmatic ‘personal objection’ successfully meets the 4 conditions of her ‘Communicative Principle’ (2012: 29). In this article I want to challenge Brownlee’s ‘universality’ condition and the ‘dialogical’ condition by focusing on a counter-example of a British GP conscientiously objecting to authorizing an abortion. I argue that such an objection can be morally admirable, even though the GP is not politically active, even though she is not open-minded to the possibility that she might be wrong, and even if she refuses to condemn her non-objecting colleagues. I suggest that this particular counter-example can tell us more general things about the nature of ethical disagreement and ethical incomprehension
Conscience · Conscientious objector · Conviction · Dialogical self · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Political science · Sociology · Universality (dynamical systems · Ethics and Legal Issues in Pediatric Healthcare · Ethics in medical practice · Law · Patient Dignity and Privacy · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2021 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |