The critical dimension of Brandom’s normative pragmatism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11340681 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Santiago Rey (0000-0002-4415-4824, Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue | 10 |
| Pages | 1520-1540 |
| Publication date | 2024-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy & Social Criticism (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0191-4537 • E-ISSN: 1461-734X |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/01914537231211036 |
| OpenAlex | W4388462079 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 17 |
For all of Brandom’s self-professed allegiance to Hegel, there is something perplexing about his fixation on semantic and epistemological issues at the expense of the type of social and political considerations that are at the heart of Hegel’s system. However, and although Brandom himself concedes that his work is circumscribed to a number of highly specialized and technical issues in the philosophy of mind and language, the truth is that his views often radiate to other philosophical fields, if not always explicitly. My claim in this article is that at the heart of Brandom’s semantic theory, there are elements of a critical project, one that offers a normative standpoint to judge and improve our current practices. Moreover, these progressive features of Brandom’s normative pragmatics should be seen in the light of his adoption of a series of hermeneutic themes, ultimately culminating in his recollective conception of rationality and his edifying view of semantics
Allegiance · Dialectic · Epistemology · Expressivism · Hegelianism · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Normative · Philosophy of language · Political science · Politics · Pragmatics · Pragmatism · Rationality · Sociology · Critical Theory and Philosophy · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy, Science, and History
| Citations per year | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |