Objectivity and the writing of history
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11345455 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alun Munslow (University of Staffordshire, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue | 1-2 |
| Pages | 43-50 |
| Publication date | 2002-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | History of European Ideas (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0191-6599 • E-ISSN: 1873-541X |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1016/s0191-6599(02)00006-2 |
| OpenAlex | W2050453510 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 3 |
How do historians approach objectivity? This is addressed by Mark Bevir in his book The Logic of the History of Ideas (1999) by his argument for an anthropological epistemology with objectivity in the historical narrative resting on the explanation of human actions/agent intentionality equating with meaning. The criticism of this position is at several levels. As sophisticated constructionists historians do not usually ask ‘Can history be objective?’ Rather, they work from the balance of evidence reflecting the intersubjectivity of truth and they acknowledge the problematic nature of inferring agent intentionality and the difficulties in equating this with ‘what it means’. Why Abraham Lincoln issued the 1863 emancipation proclamation is a case in point. No historian would claim to have located its true meaning objectively in effect doubting Mark Bevir's claim that ‘objective knowledge arises from a human practice in which we criticise and compare rival webs of theories in terms of agreed facts’ (The Logic of the History of Ideas, 1999, p. 98). There are also further challenges to an over-reliance on rational action theory and the problems associated with the selection of evidence. Equally, most historians in practice doubt objectivity emerges from an accurate knowledge of the motives that can be matched to weak authorial intentions and that this leads to action via decisions. Few historians today accept that their narrative mimics past intentionality and that this provides true meaning. The article offers four reasons for rejecting Bevir's position and concludes with a defence of the narrative-linguistic determination of meaning. This suggests that history is subject to the same narrative and imaginative constraints as other forms of realist writing, rather than being privileged by an access to knowable intentionality and that this constitutes objective historical knowledge
Argument (complex analysis · Certainty · Criticism · Epistemology · Explication · Intentionality · Linguistics · Meaning (existential · Narrative · Objectivity (philosophy · Sociology · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy, History, and Historiography
| Citations per year | 0.15 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2006 - 2023 (18) |
| Highly cited | No |