Habermas and the force of dialectical argument

Bibliographic Data

ID11346152
AuthorsMary Hesse (0000-0001-8472-2825, University of Cambridge, corresponding author)
Year1995
Volume21
Issue3
Pages367-378
Publication date1995-05-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueHistory of European Ideas (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0191-6599 • E-ISSN: 1873-541X
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1016/0191-6599(94)00260-m
OpenAlexW2056143020
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited14

In his theory of rational discourse, Habermas has made essential use of the concept of 'force of the better argument'. He does not explicitly discuss the theories of meaning and of inference that must underpin this concept, but usually construes it in terms of univocal meaning and propositional inference. These assumptions are challenged by means of examples from the use of metaphor and analogical argument in science, and it is suggested that a generalisation of such arguments applies to philosophical discourse also. Habermas's conception of modes of argument as monotonically directed towards truth should therefore be replaced by dialogue and dialectics, but it does not follow from this that argument is without rational rules

Argument (complex analysis · Argument map · Argumentation theory · Dialectic · Epistemology · Inference · Linguistics · Meaning (existential · Metaphor · Language, Discourse, Communication Strategies · Language, Metaphor, and Cognition · Philosophy · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education

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