History, meaning, and interpretation

This paper is a discussion of Mark Bevir's The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999). It focuses on three topics central to Bevir's book: his weak intentionalism; his anthropological epistemology; and his priority claim regarding sincere, conscious, and rational beliefs. It is argued that Bevir's position on these issues is problematic in certain important respects, and that some of his related critical claims against Pocock, Skinner and others are misconceived. Keywords: IntentionalismHistory of ideasEpistemologyBevirPocockSkinner Notes 1 Unless specified otherwise, references are to Mark Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999). 2 Some of the issues raised in this section are discussed further in my Transcendental Arguments and Scepticism: Answering the Question of Justification, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000. 3 This paper was presented at a panel on The Logic of the History of Ideas at the Political Studies Association conference in Manchester in April 2001. I am grateful for Mark Bevir's comments at the panel, and to Mike Kenny for organising it, as well as for his remarks on a previous version. I would also like to thank my colleague Jenny Saul for discussion of some of the issues raised in my paper

Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy · Linguistics · Meaning (existential · Originalism · Political science · Sociology · African history and culture analysis · Islamic Studies and History · Law · Philosophy

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