Revision of three-stakeholder signaling game for environmental impact assessment in China
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 11368377 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Xiao Pu (0000-0003-2191-6766), Pu Xiao (0000-0001-5393-7225, Beijing Normal University, autor de correspondencia), Hong Cheng (0009-0006-9669-8969, Beijing Normal University), Hong Guang Cheng, Li Gong (0000-0001-7135-009X), Gong Li (0000-0001-5921-6816, Beijing Normal University), Fang Hua Hao (Beijing Normal University), Ye Qi (0000-0002-5629-6774, Tsinghua University) |
| Año | 2011 |
| Volumen | 31 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 129-135 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2011-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Environmental Impact Assessment Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0195-9255 • E-ISSN: 1873-6432 |
| Editorial | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.eiar.2010.04.007 |
| OpenAlex | W2072325601 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 25 |
Business · China · Contradiction · Economics · Environmental economics · Environmental impact assessment · Game theory · Government (linguistics · Political science · Process (computing · Public economics · Public relations · Quality (philosophy · Stakeholder · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Marketing
The Methodology of Positive Economics
Public participation in EIA of nuclear power plant decommissioning projects
Appraising the role of relationships between regulators and consultants for effective EIA
Planning for sustainability at the local government level
Public participation in eia in hungary
The roles of EIA in the decision-making process
The Australian government's experience with environmental impact assessment
Local government implementation of mitigation requirements under the California Environmental Quality Act
Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory
Theory of Industrial Organization
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |