Voluntarism and Transparent Deliberation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11420028 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (0000-0002-5023-3449, University of Cambridge, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 171-176 |
| Publication date | 2006-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | South African Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0258-0136 • E-ISSN: 2073-4867 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.4314/sajpem.v25i2.31443 |
| OpenAlex | W2043095714 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 5 |
It is widely assumed that doxastic deliberation is transparent to the factual question of the truth of the proposition being considered for belief, and that this sets doxastic deliberation apart from practical deliberation. This feature is frequently invoked in arguments against doxastic voluntarism. I argue that transparency to factual questions occurs in practical deliberation in ways parallel to transparency in doxastic deliberation. I argue that this should make us reconsider the appeal to transparency in arguments against doxastic voluntarism, and the wider issue of distinguishing theoretical from practical rationality
Appeal · Deliberation · Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Political science · Proposition · Rationality · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Citations per year | 0.15 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2006 - 2013 (8) |
| Highly cited | No |