Thought and language

Bibliographic Data

ID11420681
AuthorsMichael Pendlebury (0009-0007-4260-2340, University of the Witwatersrand, corresponding author)
Year2002
Volume21
Issue3
Pages200-218
Publication date2002-01-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueSouth African Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0258-0136 • E-ISSN: 2073-4867
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.4314/sajpem.v21i3.31346
OpenAlexW2076089037
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited19

This article defends the view that nonlinguistic animals could be capable of thought (in the sense in which the mere possession of beliefs and desires is sufficient for thought). It is easy to identify flaws in Davidson’s arguments for the thesis that thought depends upon language if one is open to the idea that some nonlinguistic animals have beliefs. It is, however, necessary to do more than this if one wishes to engage with the deeper challenge underlying Davidson’s reasoning, viz., that of providing a principled account of what it takes for a representer to qualify as a thinker. Heil attempts to construct a Davidsonian account on the basis of the hypothesis that the semantic opacity essential to thought is rooted in second-order representation (which Davidson ties to language), but it can be shown that second-order representation is neither necessary nor sufficient for opacity. A reasonable non-Davidsonian account of thought in terms of which sufficiently sophisticated nonlinguistic animals qualify as thinkers is, however, possible

Cognitive science · Epistemology · Linguistics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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