British wartime thinking about a post-war European security group
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11426740 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John Baylis (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1983 |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 265-281 |
| Publication date | 1983-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Review of International Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0260-2105 • E-ISSN: 1469-9044 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0260210500115979 |
| OpenAlex | W2058609872 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 8 |
One of the most striking differences between British defence policy since 1945 and military policy during the inter-war period has been the acceptance by post-war Labour and Conservative governments of the value of undertaking a continental commitment. During the 1920s and 1930s Britain clearly retained a close interest in European affairs but consistently steered away from any form of major military involvement on the continent,, In traditional terms policy makers continued to recognize the importance of maintaining a favourable Balance of power in Europe and preventing any hostile state from dominating the Low Countries, At the same time there was also a fundamental political assumption that Britain and France would be in alliance in the event of renewed German aggression in Western Europe. Until Munich, however, the emphasis in defence planning centred on home and imperial defence. True, there were those in the defence establishment who recognized that Britain's vital interests were closely linked to Western Europe and who advocated serious preparation of an expeditionary force. But even they failed to recommend the kind of highly mobile mechanized force for specialized European operations which might have avoided the magnitude of the disasters which befell British forces in 1939–40. After Munich the British government did arrive at a recognition of the importance of some form of continental commitment but by then it was clearly too late either to create an expeditionary force of the kind required or to supplement Britain's military weakness through the establishment of an effective western alliance system
Alliance · Collective security · Economic history · Foreign policy · German · Government (linguistics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Sociology · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · History · Law · Military and Defense Studies · Military History and Strategy
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,05 |
| Citation span | 1984 - 2022 (39) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |