Cartel Laws Undermined
Corruption, Social Norms, and Collectivist Business Cultures
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11449259 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andreas Stephan (0000-0001-5776-9396, University of East Anglia, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 345-367 |
| Publication date | 2010-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Law and Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0263-323X • E-ISSN: 1467-6478 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-6478.2010.00507.x |
| OpenAlex | W2133000605 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
The combination of leniency programmes, high sanctions, complaints from customers and private actions for damages, has proven very successful at uncovering and punishing cartel agreements in United States Antitrust Law. Countless jurisdictions are being encouraged to adopt these ‘conventional’ enforcement tools, in the absence of an international competition authority. This paper identifies three issues which may undermine the universal efficacy of these cartel laws: (i) corruption and organized crime; (ii) social norms that are sympathetic to collusive practices; (iii) collectivist business cultures built on personal relationships
Business · Cartel · Collectivism · Collusion · Competition (biology · Damages · Economics · Enforcement · Individualism · Industrial organization · Language change · Law and economics · Law enforcement · Political science · Sanctions · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
| Citations per year | 0.29 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2012 - 2025 (14) |
| Highly cited | No |