Causality and Dispersion
A Reply to John Norton
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11512128 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mathias Frisch (0000-0002-1027-3796, University of Maryland, College Park, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 487-495 |
| Publication date | 2009-08-11 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axp031 |
| OpenAlex | W2091267919 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 7 |
Classical dispersion relations are derived from a time-asymmetric constraint. I argue that the standard causal interpretation of this constraint plays a scientifically legitimate role in dispersion theory, and hence provides a counterexample to the causal skepticism advanced by John Norton and others. Norton ([2009]) argues that the causal interpretation of the time-asymmetric constraint is an empty honorific and that the constraint can be motivated by purely non-causal considerations. In this paper I respond to Norton's criticisms and argue that Norton's skepticism derives its force partly by holding causal principles to a standard too high to be met by other scientifically legitimate constraints. 1. Introduction 2. Non-causal Foundations? 3. Other Grounds for Skepticism 4. The Principle of Energy Conservation
Causality (physics · Constraint (computer-aided design · Counterexample · Economics · Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy · Mathematical economics · Physics · Skepticism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Quantum Mechanics and Applications
| Citations per year | 0.24 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2009 - 2020 (12) |
| Highly cited | No |