The Question Posed at Charmides 165a-166c
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11584612 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert R Wellman (1University of Massachusetts, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1964 |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 107-113 |
| Publication date | 1964-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Phronesis (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8868 • E-ISSN: 1568-5284 |
| Publisher | Brill (PUBLISHER • NL) |
| DOI | 10.1163/156852864x00140 |
| OpenAlex | W1982065101 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
lato's major aim in the Charmides has been interpreted in a variety of ways, ranging from Taylor's belief that the dialogue's central thesis concerns the equation of and virtue to Gould's idea that it is suggesting certain limitations to the techne analogy.' While there is considerable merit in the entire range of interpretations, I believe an unnecessary amount of confusion has resulted from failing to recognize and clearly specify the major question posed in the dialogue. In the present paper I will attempt to suggest one possible understanding of this question, especially as it is formulated at 165a-166c. The ostensible theme of the Charmides is a search for a suitable definition of sophrosyne. In the course of the discussion Critias, after defining sophrosyne as the doing of good actions, digresses into an explanation of the Delphic motto 'know thyself' as an exhortation to 'be temperate.' As a result of this discourse he amends his definition to gignoskein auton eauton. The discussion which follows (165b ff) deals with the possibility of having of knowledge. The opening stages of the discussion are highly ambiguous. At first Critias states only that temperance is self-knowledge (165b),2 as a result of his understanding of the Delphic command to 'know thyself.' A little later in the conversation he restates this definition as science or knowledge of (165d),3 that is, sophrosyne is the which has oneself as its object or subject matter. Socrates, upon reflection, finds that if it is knowledge, it must be or science of something, in this case of oneself. But it is not comparable to certain of the other sciences, for example medicine and architecture, since it does not produce a concrete result (ergon) such as health or buildings. Critias answers that while this is correct, Socrates is attempting to
Analogy · Argument (complex analysis · Conversation · Epistemology · Linguistics · Object (grammar · Realm · Sociology · SOCRATES · Techne · Theme (computing · Variety (cybernetics · Virtue · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Historical Studies in Science · Law · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.11 |
| Citation span | 1999 - 2015 (17) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |