Self-Predication in Plato's Middle Dialogues
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11585014 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert Heinaman (1University College London, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue | 1-3 |
| Pages | 56-79 |
| Publication date | 1989-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Phronesis (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8868 • E-ISSN: 1568-5284 |
| Publisher | Brill (PUBLISHER • NL) |
| DOI | 10.1163/156852889x00035 |
| OpenAlex | W1966028026 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
In this paper I will argue that Plato is committed to self-predication in dialogues generally agreed to be earlier than the Parmenides. By this I mean not merely that Plato is committed to statements of the form (1) F-ness is F (S-statements) where F-ness is a Form. That Plato was committed to such statements is beyond dispute.' Rather I am claiming that (1) must be interpreted to mean (2) F-ness is characterized by F, or possesses F. While my thesis may well be accepted by a majority of scholars, there are a number of holdouts who have proposed alternative interpretations of (1). The main contenders are the following: (3) F-ness is identical with F2 (4) F-ness makes whatever participates in it F3 (5) N [ (x)(Fx-. Fx) ]4 (6) F-ness is what it is to be F' (7) F-ness is what is F (or F itself or the nature of F).6 I believe there is clear evidence in the dialogues which supports (2) as the correct interpretation of (1), but the present paper will be limited to trying
Ancient philosophy · Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy · Linguistics · Classical Antiquity Studies · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2016 - 2016 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |