The Virtue of Knowing-How
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11605014 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Felipe Rocha Lima Santos (0000-0001-9319-9538, Universidade Federal da Bahia, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 483-499 |
| Publication date | 2016-06-10 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Veritas (Porto Alegre) (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0042-3955 • E-ISSN: 1984-6746 |
| Publisher | Edipucrs (PUBLISHER • BR) |
| DOI | 10.15448/1984-6746.2015.3.24270 |
| OpenAlex | W2470196228 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 14 |
Intellectualists about knowledge-how state that knowledgehow is a kind of propositional knowledge. Anti-intellectualists try to show that there are cases where the agent has knowledge-how without knowing-that. This paper focuses on recent anti-intellectualists’ arguments by Carter and Pritchard. I argue that Carter and Pritchard’s arguments are not well succeeded and that, if we apply virtue epistemology to this debate, we can conclude that knowledge-how shares the same epistemic properties as propositional knowledge. If this is correct, we can say that knowledge-how is a kind of propositional knowledge and intellectualism is safe again
Descriptive knowledge · Epistemology · Intellectualism · Virtue · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Knowing HowEssays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action
Knowledge and Practical Interests
The Nature and Value of Knowledge
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge
Knowing How
The Concept of Mind
Testimony and knowing how
Know how to be Gettiered
A (Different) Virtue Epistemology
Knowledge‐How and Cognitive Achievement
| Highly cited | No |
|---|