An issue for Wegner’s theory about the conscious will
The Readiness Potential does not conclusively represent preparation for an action
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11605265 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Beatriz Sorrentino Marques (0000-0001-7192-0777, Universidade Federal de Mato Grosso, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 1029-1045 |
| Publication date | 2017-12-28 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Veritas (Porto Alegre) (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0042-3955 • E-ISSN: 1984-6746 |
| Publisher | Edipucrs (PUBLISHER • BR) |
| DOI | 10.15448/1984-6746.2017.3.25773 |
| OpenAlex | W2777210236 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 19 |
The role of consciousness in the production of actions has received much attention from philosophy and neuroscience. Wegner (2002) claims that what he calls the conscious will plays no role in the causal production of human actions, and that it is just an illusion. I will argue that Wegner’s claim is mistaken, because his defense of the alleged illusion rests on how he conceives of what the Readiness Potential (RP) represents in a key experiment—Libet’s experiment—and this conception is mistaken. Therefore, Wegner has not offered a convincing reason to believe that humans are deluded about the way they produce their actions
Action (physics · Cognitive psychology · Consciousness · Economics · Epistemology · Illusion · Physics · Production (economics · Free Will and Agency · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Personal Agency
Effective Intentions
Timing of the brain events underlying access to consciousness during the attentional blink
Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential)
Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
The Illusion of Conscious Will
Brain preparation before a voluntary action
Intentional action
| Highly cited | No |
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