Efficiency and Domination in the Socialist Republic

A Reply to O’Shea

Bibliographic Data

ID11622865
AuthorsHarrison Frye (0000-0002-7181-6504, University of Georgia, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume48
Issue5
Pages573-580
Publication date2020-02-04
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitical Theory (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0090-5917 • E-ISSN: 1552-7476
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0090591720903392
OpenAlexW3004526676
LanguageEN
Citations received9

In a recent essay in this journal, Tom O’Shea defends socialist republicanism, marrying the value of freedom as nondomination to public ownership of the means of production. In this reply, I argue that the efficiency costs that often attach to public ownership may undercut the ability of the socialist republic to combat domination by public agents. I provide two reasons in support of this claim. First, the economic gains provided by efficiency can insulate individuals from the discretionary power of other agents. Put briefly, the more wealth you have, the less the discretionary power threatens your basic interests. Second, the efficiency costs of public ownership also make it more difficult to hold accountable the managers of economic organizations. This shortcoming of O’Shea’s argument reveals a point hitherto neglected in the republican literature—caring about nondomination implies caring about efficiency

Argument (complex analysis · Economic efficiency · Economics · Law and economics · Market economy · Point (geometry · Political economy · Political science · Power (physics · Public finance · Public ownership · Value (mathematics · Economic Theory and Institutions · Law · Political Economy and Marxism

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