Bargaining Constitutional Design in Italy
Judicial Review as Political Insurance
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11634665 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mary L Volcansek (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 280-296 |
| Publication date | 2010-02-18 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | West European Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0140-2382 • E-ISSN: 1743-9655 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/01402380903538906 |
| OpenAlex | W2042211147 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 28 |
Why would politicians, who expect to hold political power in the future, choose to create a constitutional court with the power of judicial review that can veto politicians' policies? Some theories suggest that international forces may be causal, as institutions or ideas are diffused geographically or within legal systems. Others focus on domestic politics as driving the decision to institute judicial review. Among these are the commitment, hegemonic preservation, party alternation and insurance theories. This article looks at the decision to establish a constitutional court in the Republic of Italy, the first post-World War II court in Europe that was not in a federal system. It argues that the insurance model drove the decision of the Italian Christian Democrats to support creation of a constitutional court at the point of constitutional design, but later to delay implementation once in power. Conversely, the Italian Communist–Socialist bloc opposed establishment of the court at the Constituent Assembly that wrote the post-war constitution on the ideological ground that it was contrary to popular sovereignty. However, once the leftist bloc found itself in the role of the opposition, it became a champion of the Constitutional Court and judicial review. The insurance theory is shown to explain the behaviour of the Christian Democrats in both design and implementation phases and the actions of the Communist–Socialist bloc during implementation
Constitution · Constitutional court · Economics · Judicial activism · Judicial review · Opposition (politics · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Sovereignty · Veto · European and International Law Studies · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Law in Society and Culture
Democracy, Italian style
Judicial Review in New Democracies
Governing with Judges
Courts under Constraints
The Power of Judges
The Rule of Law in the Arab World
The Birth of Judicial Politics in France
The Politics of the Question of Constituent Power
Patterns of democracy
The Struggle for Constitutional Power
The new Cameroonian constitutional council in a comparative perspective
The new Israeli constitution
The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe
Towards Juristocracy
Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy
The Italian Election of April 2008
Constitutional courts as veto players
Veto and Voice in the Courts
Judicious choices
Judicial Activism in Post-Communist Politics
Constitutionalism and Democracy
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,19 |
| Citation span | 2000 - 2025 (26) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |