Curing the Mischiefs of Faction in the American Administrative State

Bibliographic Data

ID11673577
AuthorsBrian J Cook (0000-0001-7563-7012, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, USA, corresponding author)
Year2015
Volume46
Issue1
Pages3-27
Publication date2015-10-23
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe American Review of Public Administration (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0275-0740 • E-ISSN: 1552-3357
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0275074015612160
OpenAlexW2270922420
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited77

The worries American citizens express about the distorting influence of minority factions, or special interests, on public governance are as old as the republic. I briefly recount the constitutional design flaws and developmental changes that have combined to make these worries more valid than ever in an age of administratively centered governance. I then review the evidence on the nature and extent of special interest influence on the administrative process from a broad swath of scholarship. After noting the limited efficacy of attempts to limit special interest influence via minor tinkering with the separation of powers, I argue for more fundamental structural change in the form of administration as a separate, constitutionally recognized element of the separation of powers. I outline basic structural features and offer hypothetical yet plausible consequences of such a design change. The latter, I contend, are amenable to confirmation or refutation through systematic analysis of evidence that is already available from past and current governing experience

Constitution · Corporate governance · Economics · Element (criminal law · Law and economics · Management · Political science · Positive economics · Scholarship · Separation of powers · Sociology · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Public Policy and Administration Research

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub