When Government Programs Create Inequities
A Guide to Compensation Policies
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 11680504 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Joseph J Cordes (autor de correspondencia), Burton A Weisbrod |
| Año | 1985 |
| Volumen | 4 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 178-178 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1985-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Policy Analysis and Management (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0276-8739 • E-ISSN: 1520-6688 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.2307/3324623 |
| OpenAlex | W3123362524 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 3 |
When the government institutes a program thought to be useful for society as a whole, such as building a highway or controlling air pollution, those that benefit from such programs are usually quite different from those that bear its costs. Sometimes the government responds by postponing or modifying the program, sometimes by compensating those that are bearing an inequitable share of the costs. By using familiar economic concepts, the analyst can more effectively choose between the two approaches. Applying those concepts to the case of highway construction in California, we conclude that in this instance cash compensation is clearly superior to postponement as the policy of choice
Business · Compensation (psychology · Economic growth · Economics · Government (linguistics · Political science · Public economics · Construction Project Management and Performance · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Psychology · Public Administration · Social Psychology · Sustainable Building Design and Assessment
| Obras citantes distintas | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,08 |
| Intervalo de citas | 1987 - 2017 (31) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 3 |