Financial incentives and welfare reform in the United States

This paper uses a microsimulation model to ask whether welfare recipients in the United States would work full-time if offered an earnings supplement that was conditioned on full-time employment. The simulations suggest that the earnings supplement would increase full-time employment, with little additional cash transfer cost to the government. In contrast, financial incentives currently being used by many of the states are increasing employment and income, but are encouraging primarily part-time employment. Encouraging full-time employment is particularly important in light of new time limits on welfare receipt. Faced with a loss of welfare benefits, many recipients may find that part-time earnings do not allow them to be economically self-sufficient. © 2001 by the Association of Public Policy Analysis and Management

Ask price · Business · Cash · Earnings · Economics · Government (linguistics · Incentive · Labour economics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Public economics · Receipt · Transfer payment · Welfare · Welfare reform · Work (physics · demographic modeling and climate adaptation · Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics · Accounting · Finance

• Handbook of Public Policy Analysis

  Gerald J Miller, Frank Fischer et al.•Handbook of Public Policy Analysis•2006

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