Building connections
Political corruption and road construction in India
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11888654 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jonathan Lehne (Paris School of Economics, corresponding author), Jacob N Shapiro (0000-0002-7484-229X, Princeton University), Oliver Vanden Eynde (0000-0002-2396-1248, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 131 |
| Pages | 62-78 |
| Publication date | 2017-11-29 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Development Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0304-3878 • E-ISSN: 1872-6089 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2017.10.009 |
| OpenAlex | W2508499414 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 54 |
| References cited | 49 |
Business · Development economics · Economics · Language change · Market economy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Public economics · Regression discontinuity design · Road construction · Term (time · Transport engineering · Welfare · Auction Theory and Applications · Corruption and Economic Development · Engineering · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law
Why Does the Indian State Both Fail and Succeed
Rural Roads and Local Economic Development
Public sector corruption in South Asia
Transportation infrastructure and good health in urban China
Boosted income, busted environment
Corruption, homelessness and disasters
Hospital allocation and politicians
Perceived Nepotism and Job Satisfaction
Political connections and post-disaster assistance in rural Vietnam
Farewell President! Political favoritism, economic inequality, and political polarization
Do Criminal Politicians Affect Firm Investment and Value? Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Approach
Rural Roads, Poverty, and Resilience
What Candidates Benefit From Corruption? Opportunities for Corruption and the Prevalence of Candidates With Business Ties
Political Interference in the Rural Water Schemes in Eastern Nepal
Rent-Seeking and Criminal Politicians
Jam-Barrel Politics
Complementarities in Infrastructure
Complementarities in Infrastructure
Political Liberalization and State Capture by Business Interests
Unjust by default
Does confidence in local governments moderate drought-induced migration? Empirical evidence from India
Criminal Politicians and Socioeconomic Development
Elections and Corruption
Nepotism, political competition and overemployment
Regional Favouritism, Elections, and Legacies of Inequality
Policy actions for developing the infrastructure sector
Coping with political interference and resource scarcity
How Electoral Cycles Shape the Implementation of Public Works Programs
Transport infrastructure and urban-rural income disparity
Does Local Elite Capture Vary by Levels of Political Connections? Evidence from an Indian Public Housing Program
It’s our turn (not) to learn
Political donations, public procurement and government efficiency
Post-clientelistic initiatives in a patronage democracy
Corruption and averting Aids deaths
Corruption and cheating
Do rural roads create pathways out of poverty? Evidence from India
The long road to health
Do criminally accused politicians affect economic outcomes? Evidence from India
High-speed railroads and local agricultural development
Building networks
Local connectivity and corruption
Local favoritism in China's public procurement
Road maintenance over the local election cycle
Greasing the Wheels
Private Returns to Public Investment
Trends
Money down the drain
Incentives, audits and procurement
Bureaucratic Capacity and Political Favoritism in Public Procurement
Political Corruption Cycles
Development or Rent Seeking? How Political Influence Shapes Public Works Provision in India
Transparent constructions
The Modernity of Caste and the Market Economy
Unpacking Bribery
Monitoring Corruptible Politicians
Optimal Bandwidth Choice for the Regression Discontinuity Estimator
Local Capture
Estimating the Value of Political Connections
Randomized experiments from non-random selection in U.S. House elections
The economics of corruption
Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design
Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics
Why Ethnic Parties Succeed
The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers
Obtaining a Driver's License in India
Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption, Illustrated With Italian Data
Electoral Accountability and Corruption
Corruption
Exposing Corrupt Politicians
Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability
Traveling Agents
Do criminally accused politicians affect economic outcomes? Evidence from India
Corruption and Rent-Seeking
The Simple Economics of Extortion
An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery
The Private Returns to Public Office
Monitoring Corruption
Elections and the Regression Discontinuity Design
Ethnic groups in conflict
Are Poor Voters Indifferent to Whether Elected Leaders Are Criminal or Corrupt? A Vignette Experiment in Rural India
Privileging One’s Own? Voting Patterns and Politicized Spending in India
Political and Institutional Checks on Corruption
On the Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design for Estimating Electoral Effects
MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics
Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption
The Returns to Office in a "Rubber Stamp" Parliament
Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Development
| Unique citing works | 54 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 6,75 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2026 (9) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 53 |