Civil institutions and evolution
Concepts, critique and models
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11889902 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kaushik Basu (0000-0002-3705-055X, Centre for Development Economics, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1995 |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 19-33 |
| Publication date | 1995-02-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Development Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0304-3878 • E-ISSN: 1872-6089 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/0304-3878(94)00046-f |
| OpenAlex | W1968857795 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 18 |
The paper examines the relation between civil norms and evolution. The survival of norms in the long run may depend on the evolutionary process and natural selection. The sieve of natural selection may ensure that norms which persist must have minimal efficiency properties. This paper begins with a general discussion of evolutionary processes and the survival of civil institutions. It then presents an introductory account of the theory of evolutionary games. It is argued that the model of evolutionary games is more suited to analyzing animal behaviour than the human one. Since it is the latter that is of interest to economists, an attempt is made in this paper to develop some new solution concepts which are more apt for human games
Biology · Economics · Epistemology · Evolutionary biology · Evolutionary game theory · Evolutionary theory · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Natural (archaeology · Natural selection · Process (computing · Relation (database · Selection (genetic algorithm · Sociology · Survival of the fittest · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Philosophy · Artificial Intelligence
Evolution and the Theory of Games
The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales
The Logic of Animal Conflict
The Economic theory of agrarian institutions
Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Institutions in Economic Development
An inquiry into quasi‐credit contracts
Agrarian Structure and Economic Underdevelopment
Evolution and the Theory of Games
The New Institutional Economics and its applicability to development
Analytics of the institutions of informal cooperation in rural development
Agrarian structure and economic underdevelopment
The efficiency of the mesta
The growth and decay of custom
Job Market Signaling
| Citations per year | 0.17 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1996 - 2009 (14) |
| Highly cited | No |