Variations in forms of tenancy in a peasant economy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11890801 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Pranab Bardhan (0000-0002-2378-9281, University of California, Berkeley, corresponding author), Pranab K Bardhan |
| Year | 1977 |
| Volume | 4 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 105-118 |
| Publication date | 1977-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Development Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0304-3878 • E-ISSN: 1872-6089 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/0304-3878(77)90019-0 |
| OpenAlex | W2060656546 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 29 |
| References cited | 4 |
Agrarian society · Agriculture · Economic system · Economics · Geography · Imperfect · Labour economics · Leasehold estate · Market economy · Peasant · Political science · Sharecropping · Wage · Agriculture, Land Use, Rural Development · Land Rights and Reforms
Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis
Contracts With Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal–Agent Relationships
Interlinkages and the Pattern of Competition
Peasants' Risk Aversion and the Choice of Marketing Intermediaries and Contracts
A Note on Interlinked Rural Economic Arrangements
Agrarian Structure, Technological Innovations, and the State
Institutional Analysis of Credit Co‐Operatives
Theories of Sharecropping
On Choice Among Creditors and Bonded Labour Contracts
A Comparison of Principal–Agent and Bargaining Solutions
Credit Rationing, Tenancy, Productivity, and the Dynamics of Inequality
Production Relations in Semi‐Arid African Agriculture
Agricultural Institutions for Insurance and Stabilization
Rational Peasants, Efficient Institutions, and a Theory of Rural Organization
Rural Credit Markets
The Economic theory of agrarian institutions
Some Aspects of Linked Product and Credit Market Contracts Among Risk‐Neutral Agents
Agricultural Producer Co‐Operatives
Endogenizing institutions and institutional changes
Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Institutions in Economic Development
Credit and Agrarian Class Structure
Contracts, resource use and productivity in sharecropping
Theories of Share Tenancy
Sharing, Monitoring, and Incentives
Čajanov, Kerblay et les shestidesiatniki
The puzzle of sharecropping
Rent, income distribution and growth in an underdeveloped agrarian economy
The Moral or the Rational Peasant? Competing Hypotheses of Collective Action
The same contract that is suitable for your Excellency
| Unique citing works | 29 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.62 |
| Citation span | 1979 - 2024 (46) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 28 |